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THE POSTMAN ALWAYS RINGS 4,000
TIMES: NEW APPROACHES TO
CURB SPAM
by

CREDENCE

I.

E. FoGot

INTRODUCTION

Before 1994, the average Internet user received little unsolicited
commercial email ("UCE"), or "spain." Before large Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") offered flat-rate pricing and the World-Wide Web experienced phenomenal growth, the Internet was still mostly the province
of university students and the computer literati: it was not a mass medium particularly attractive to advertisers. But that all changed in April
1994, when enterprising Arizona lawyers Laurence Canter and Martha
Siegel sent UCE advertising their immigration law "services"' to approximately 8,000 Usenet newsgroups. 2 The ad reached approximately 20
million people, inspiring irate Usenet users to flame Canter and Siegel in
such great volume that the attorneys' ISP's computer crashed. 3 The
computer overloads Canter and Siegel's stunt caused also completely
knocked out New Zealand's Internet access. 4 The couple remained undeterred by the flames, telephone harassment, and death threats they
received after their first foray into direct marketing.5 After Canter and
Siegel spammed the Internet again in 1995, their ISP terminated their
t Law clerk to Judge Robert Beezer, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. J.D. 1998, University of Oregon School of Law; A.B. 1992, University of Chicago. The author wishes to
thank Garrett Epps for his advice and feedback, and Jamey Carter for the title.
1. The pair was offering to fill out "green card" lottery applications for $95/person, a
task that does not require a lawyer's assistance. See also Peter H. Lewis, Unrepentant
Lawyers Hit by InternetMobs After Incident, Austin American-Statesman, May 30, 1994, at
C3 available in 1994 WL 3943016.
2. See Michael Covington, Ethics and the Internet, ELECTRONICS Now, Sept. 1, 1997,
at 42, available in 1997 WL 9419626.
3. See Mark Hansen, Lawyers' Internet Ad Angers Users, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 26.
4. See Maria O'Daniel, First 'Troopers' of the Spain Wars, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Dec.
18, 1997, at 53, available in 1997 WL 15079023.

5. See LAURENCE A. CANTER & MARTHA S. SIEGEL, HOW TO MAKE A FORTUNE ON THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: EVERYONE'S GUERRILLA GUIDE TO MARKETING ON THE
INTERNET AND OTHER ON-LINE SERVICES (1994).
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Internet connection.
Following in Canter and Siegel's footsteps, countless direct marketers have taken the lawyers' technique to a new level and sent their ads to
thousands of individual email accounts at a time. Because this marketing technique is easier and far less costly to the advertisers than an
equivalent number of direct mail solicitations, email accounts worldwide
have been deluged with "make money fast" scams, pyramid schemes, and
dubious chain letters. 7 The burden millions of daily spams place on the
worldwide computer network has the potential to bring down the Internet one node at a time.
A campaign against mass UCE is taking place in Congress, the
courts, and state legislatures. As of October 2000, Congress is considering five anti-spam bills; thirty-three states have introduced or passed
anti-spam legislation. In addition, an increasing number of ISPs have
filed suit against spammers who have taken advantage of their networks.8 The Federal Trade Commission has even taken steps to prevent
the consumer fraud spammers all too often perpetrate. 9
This article will analyze the spam problem under First Amendment
"commercial speech" jurisprudence, including lawsuits that senders of
junk faxes filed (unsuccessfully) challenging the legal restrictions that
form the most sensible template for an effective anti-spam law. Part II
will explore the social and technological context in which the spam problem developed, and will discuss the true financial costs of the practice.
Part III will describe ISPs' and state governments' unsuccessful attempts to restrict the most destructive aspects of spamming. Part IV
analyzes the First Amendment protections of spam as "commercial
speech" and examines five federal proposals to curtail spam, concentrating on their legality and likely effectiveness. The article concludes that
two solutions-amending the junk fax law to cover Internet solicitations,
or a bill currently in Congress that provides civil and criminal penalties
for engaging in some of the most egregious spamming practices-will be
6. See Spammer Attorneys Get Disconnected From Internet, NEWSBYTES NEWS NET-

WORK, Feb. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 220757.
7. Federal Trade Commission, FTC Unveils "DirtyDozen Spam Scams" (visited Mar.
28, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9807/dozen.htm>. According to the Federal Trade
Commission, the 12 most common types of spams include 'business opportunity scams...
making money by sending bulk e-mailings... chain letters ... work-at-home schemes...
health and diet scams ... easy money ... get something free ... investment opportunities ... cable descrambler kits ... guaranteed loans or credit, on easy terms . . . credit
repair scams ... [and] vacation prize promotions." Id.
8. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
9. See Federal Trade Commission, PreparedStatement of the Federal Trade Commission on "UnsolicitedCommercial Email"(last modified Jan. 8, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/
1999/9911spamtestimony991103.htm> (describing the FrC's enforcement, monitoring,
and educational approaches to dealing with spain).
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the most effective and the least vulnerable to First Amendment challenges. It also suggests an alternative, model bill that would bring together the best of the current proposals before Congress and close their
loopholes.
II.
A.

SPAM

DEFINITION

"Spam" is any unsolicited email message sent in large quantities,
usually to a large number of recipients, often using forged headers to
avoid bounce-backs from bad addresses and angry replies ("flames") from
unwilling recipients. It need not be commercial: many netizens consider
chain letters, solicitations from advocacy groups, and political ads 10 sent
in this manner to be spam.
The term also describes such messages sent to Usenet newsgroups,
when the topic of the newsgroup is unrelated to the product or service
the spammer is hawking. However, this article will not address the regulation of Usenet spam, such as Canter and Siegel's, because such regulation would have a significantly chilling effect on free speech.
Undoubtedly, Usenet spam is destructive, annoying, and obnoxious. The
havoc spam has wrought upon Usenet should not be underestimated."
It is not uncommon to find some Usenet noncommercial discussion
groups overwhelmingly full of spam; often the original topic of conversation, as in the Monty Python skit, the original topic of conversation is
completely drowned out. "Spam wastes so much time and makes real
messages so hard to find," one commentator notes, "that it can destroy
12
the usefulness of online forums."
Nevertheless, regulation of Usenet spam would create more of a
First Amendment problem than regulation of email spain for three reasons. First, insofar as the government might regulate UCE to protect
users' privacy interest in their email accounts, the rationale does not
translate to Usenet. Second, the government's interest in protecting Net
users involved in e-commerce from business losses caused by system
slowdowns is inapplicable to Usenet. Finally, the pressure Usenet
spams place on system processors is, despite the havoc Canter and Siegel
10. See, e.g., Rebecca Fairley Raney, New Issue for Political Campaigns: The Spam
Question, N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1998 (describing advocacy groups' and politicians' uses of
spain during 1998 campaign season); Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email,
About the Problem (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.cauce.org/problem.html> (detailing
characteristics of "the most commonly seen UCEs.").
11. See Maria Seminiero, Is Usenet Choking on Spam? (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http:/!
www.zdnet.com/zdnn/content/zdnn/0220/286921.html>.
12. John S. Quarterman, The True Cost of Spare, MICROTIMES (last modified Aug. 14,
1997) <http://www.microtimes.com/165/internet.html>.
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wrought, less intense than with email spams, because a spam that goes
into Usenet only hits hundreds or a few thousand newsgroups, as opposed to email spam, which can hit many thousands (or millions) of
email accounts and generate thousands of bad address bounce-backs,
which clog up ISPs' central processors. Consequently, unless otherwise
indicated this article will use the term "spam" to denote commercial
messages sent to individual email addresses.
The use of the term "spam" to denote UCE is derived from a Monty
Python sketch in which a couple attempts to order breakfast at a diner
that serves nothing but SPAM. 13 The link between Monty Python's beleaguered diners and email users is that, as in the sketch, inappropriate,
unwanted, and exceedingly numerous spam messages can overwhelm
wanted communiqu6s: legitimate email can become impossible to separate from the spam.14 A less well-known etymology has it that "spam"
x5
stands for "send phenomenal amounts of mail."
B.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Many spammers argue that their messages are just like the junk
mail everybody receives in the physical world. People who aren't interested in passing on a chain letter, making money fast, or having sex with
13. Monty Python's Flying Circus: The Spam Sketch (BBC television broadcast, Dec.
15, 1970). When the wife attempts to order her breakfast without SPAM, she is drowned
out by a horde of Vikings singing the meat product's praises:
Man: Well, what've you got?
Waitress: Well, there's egg and bacon; egg, sausage, and bacon; egg and SPAM;
egg, bacon, and SPAM; egg, bacon, sausage, and SPAM; SPAM, bacon, sausage,
and SPAM; SPAM, egg, SPAM, SPAM, bacon, and SPAM; SPAM, sausage, SPAM,
SPAM, bacon, SPAM, tomato, and SPAM.
Vikings (starting to chant): SPAM, SPAM, SPAM, SPAM ....
Waitress: . . . SPAM, SPAM, SPAM, egg, and SPAM; SPAM, SPAM, SPAM,
SPAM, SPAM, SPAM, baked beans, SPAM, SPAM, SPAM ....
Vikings (singing): SPAM! Lovely SPAM! Lovely SPAM!
Waitress: ... or Lobster Thermidor au Crevettes with a mornay sauce served in a
Provencale manner with shallots and aubergines garnished with truffle pat6,
brandy, and with a fried egg on top, and SPAM.
Wife: Have you got anything without SPAM?
Waitress: Well, there's SPAM, egg, sausage, and SPAM; that's not got much SPAM
in it.
Wife: I don't want ANY SPAM!
Id.
14. See, e.g., Testimony of Ray Everett-Church before the Senate Communications
Subcommittee (visited Aug. 12, 2000) <www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/0617eve.pdf>
(describing inconvenience of"wad[ing] through dozens of unsolicited advertising messages"
in order to find legitimate email). Everett-Church was testifying on behalf of the Coalition
Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (which he co-founded), as well as the Forum for
Responsible and Ethical Email. Id.
15. Ken Hollis, alt.spam FAQ, or FiguringOut Fake E-Mail and Posts, (last modified
Jan. 17, 2000) <http://ddi.digital.net/-gandalf/spamfaq.html>.
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a virtual girlfriend should simply perform the electronic equivalent of
throwing away a Publisher's Clearinghouse circular, and hit the delete
key.16
Unfortunately, such a "solution" is deceptively simple and only diverts attention from the true costs of spam, which are both more expensive and widespread than direct marketers care to admit. In reality,
spam has wrought incredible costs on Internet users, threatening the
medium's financial and technical integrity. In terms of wasted personhours, spam's cumulative costs are incalculable. One conservative estimate places the cost at more than $87 million per year. 17 Aside from the
is
aggregate amount of time wasted skimming and disposing of spain,
ISPs' employees spend many additional hours resolving consumer complaints about spam emanating (or appearing to emanate) from their domains and attempting to track down the culprits. Of course, because
spammers routinely forge their headers, many complaints fielded by an
ISP's staff regard spam that originates from a completely different
source. However, the cost in staff time does not end with customer service: any calculation of the true costs of spam must also take into account
the not-insignificant expense of fixing servers that crash under the
weight of thousands of pieces of junk mail and losses suffered by businesses that lose orders or other valuable communications due to such

outages. 19
In addition to financial and technical damage, the onslaught of virtual come-ons has done what some view as irreparable harm to the social
fabric of the Internet. These costs are, of course, not as easily quantified
as the economic damage. Many longtime netizens (in Internet time,
that's about ten years) believe that the proliferation of spam during the
past several years has irreparably damaged the character of the online
community 20 by changing the atmosphere from Bughouse Square 21 to
16. See Janet Kornblum, Spamford Speaks (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http:l!
www.technews. netscape.com/news/0-1014-201-1474964-0.html> (quoting "Spain King"
Sanford Wallace). "Email has technology to help filter. People can reject mail." Id.
17. See Quarterman, supra note 12.
18. As spammers become more sophisticated, they have begun to mark their messages
with deliberately innocuous subject lines designed to fool the recipient (and mail filters)
into opening and reading the message, rather than disposing of it unread. SEE ALSO Allan
Hoffman, Digging Out From an Avalanche of Spam, Star-Ledger (Newark, NJ), Sept. 11,
2000, at 061, available in 2000 WL 26254638.
19. See, e.g., John Rendleman, GTE Internet Email Sags Under Spam Attack, PC
WEEK ONLINE (Dec. 29, 1997) (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcweekl news/
1229/29egte.html> (describing 24-hour outage caused by spam that made 600 businesses
lose service).
20. See Quarterman, supra note 12.
21. Bughouse Square is a "town square" in Chicago where speakers hold forth on political and social topics during summertime lunch hours.
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that of a carnival.
III.

BACKGROUND: EARLY LEGAL RESPONSES TO SPAM

The most compelling argument in favor of federal regulation of spain
is that, as with telesolicitations and junk faxes during the 1980s, no
other measure has worked.

A.

PRIVATE ISP SUITS

Initially, netizens attempted self-help through four methods. The
first was vigilantism: This method included mailbombing, 22 harassment, 23 and imposition of the Usenet death penalty. 24 The second, third,
and fourth methods were more civilized: individuals complained, programmers raced to develop technical blocks, and ISPs terminated spam25
mers' accounts.
Quickly it became clear that self-help would not work. ISPs and
other victims of spam turned to the courts. They deployed a dizzying
variety of statutory and common law legal theories. The first major category of such claims argued that spammers' practice of forging headers
and displaying ISPs' logos and names at the Web sites to which hyperlinks in the spam led violated ISPs' intellectual property rights in their
names, trademarks, and copyrights. 2 6 Such lawsuits generally claim
22.
J., Dec.
23.
15.
24.

See Jeff Bounds, Spamming Battles Lead to Nasty Fights, Litigation, DALLAS Bus.
12, 1997, at 1C.
See Incoming! Firm Endures Cyber Assault, DES MOINES REG., May 12, 1997, at

See Shirley Duglin Kennedy, Updates on Use and Abuse of the Net, INFORMATION
Apr. 1, 1998, at 46. See also Ken Lucke, Usenet Death Penalty FAQ (last
modified Jan. 11, 2000) <http://www.stopspam.org/usenetfaqs/udp.html>. The "Usenet
death penalty" is a sanction imposed by an unofficial group of systems administrators who
"take it upon [themselves] to block or cancel every message posed to Usenet from a site [sic]
whose administration is deemed to be 'soft' on the issue of spamming by its users." Id.
25. See Claudia Montague, Don't Want It, Don't Need It, Didn'tAsk for it, Marketing
Tools, Sept. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2331422 (individual complaints); see also AOL
Spam-Blocking Tool Draws Complaints, Interactive Daily, Oct. 31, 1996, availablein 1996
WL 13462189 (technical blocks); Internet Spain: NETCOM Cracks Down on Spam, EDGE:
Work-Group Computing Rep., Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9039950 (termination
of accounts).
26. See, e.g., Law Journal Extra!, The LJX Files (visited Feb. 26, 1998) <http:l/
www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/all/aolsuit.html> (alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), 1125(a),
and 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)); complaint filed for America Online v. Prime Data (last modified
Oct. 22, 1997) <httpJ/www.jmls.edulcyber/cases/all-pdO.html> (alleging false designation of
origin in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1125(a); hereinafter "Prime Data Complaint"); complaint
filed for Bigfoot Partners v. Cyber Promotions (last modified Oct. 12, 1997) <http://
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/bf-cp0.html> (alleging service mark infringement and dilution in
violation of 15 U.S.C. §1114, and common law misappropriation of name and identity; hereinafter "Bigfoot Complaint"); complaint filed for CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions (last
TECHNOLOGY,
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that an ISP's trademark or copyright is violated when spammers forge
the service's name onto an email header. These types of claims have also
been made in cases in which the spam included a hyperlink (usually to a
pornographic site) upon which the ISP's name and/or logo appeared
without its consent. These legal theories have found favor with the
courts; relief, however, is only available to those ISPs with the resources
to hire intellectual property attorneys.
The second major category of claims alleges violations of state and
27
federal laws that ban fraudulent and abusive computer practices.
These charges generally stem from actual physical damage that voluminous amounts of spare can cause to overwhelmed servers. They are often
28
augmented by common law nuisance, trespass, and conversion claims.
modified Nov. 7, 1996) <http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/cs-cpl.html> (hereinafter "Cyber
Promotions Complaint"); complaint filed for EPLR: Concentric Network Corp. v. Wallace
(visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.bna.com/e-law/docs/concentr.html> (alleging violations
of the Lanham Act (false designation of origin), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); hereinafter "Concentric
Complaint"); Copy of Complaint as filed (last modified Jan. 28, 2000) <http://expertpages.com/anti-webpiracy/filingl.htm> (copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106); complaint filed for Juno Online Services v. Scott Allen Export Sales (last modified
Jan. 5, 1998) (http://www.jmls. edu/cyber/cases/juno/comp.html> (alleging Lanham Act violation, 15 U.S.C. §1125, common law misappropriation, common law misrepresentation;
hereinafter "Juno Complaint"); complaint filed for Prodigy v. Cyberpromo (last modified
Sept. 20, 1997) <http://spam.abuse.netspam/ news/prodigy.html> (hereinafter "Prodigy
Complaint"); Strong . First Amended Complaint (last modified Aug. 30, 1997) <http://
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/strong/compl.html> (trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114, false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Lanham Act), common law
trademark infringement and unfair competition; hereinafter "Strong Complaint"); complaint filed for Typhoon, Inc. v. Kentech Enterprises (last modified Oct. 13, 1997) <http://
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/typhoonl.html> (alleging violation of Lanham Act (false designation of origin/false description) and 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (common law misappropriation,
misappropriation of name/domain; hereinafter "Typhoon Complaint").
27. See, e.g., complaintfiled for America Online v. Over the Air (visited Sept. 30, 2000)
<http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/aol/aolsuit.htm> (violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994); hereinafter "Over the Air Complaint"); Prime Data Complaint, supra note 26, at Counts I, IV (same, as well as violation of Virginia Computer
Crimes Act, VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-152.1); Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 26, at paras. 66-73
(violation of Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701-11 (1994)); Cyber
Promotions Complaint, supra note 26 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); Concentric Complaint, supra note 26, (Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act); Strong Complaint, supra note 26 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); Typhoon
Complaint, supra note 26 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
28. See, e.g., Over the Air Complaint, supra note 27 (conversion and trespass to chattels); Prime Data Complaint, supra note 26 (conversion, trespass to chattels, and conspiracy to commit trespass and conversion); Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 26 (trespass to
chattels, conversion); Cyber Promotions Complaint, supra note 26 (trespass); Concentric
Complaint, supra note 26 (trespass and conversion); Complaint filed for Expert Pages v.
Lawinfo.com (last modified May 31, 2000) <http://expertpages. com/anti-webpiract/filingl.htm> (trespass); Parker v. C.N. Enterprises - Petition (last modified June 9, 1997)
<http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/flowersl.html> (nuisance, trespass, and conversion);
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Finally, ISP plaintiffs have asserted a smattering of more novel legal
theories, which have met with less success. These include libel, 2 9 unjust
32
31
enrichment, 30 breach of implied covenant, interference with contract,
fraud, 33 negligence, 3 4 the tort of publicity, 3 5 false light, 36 outrageous38
ness, 3 7 and the federal law against sending junk faxes.
Despite the huge amount of time, effort, and money ISPs have
poured into defending their equipment and customers, it has become
clear that scattershot private suits by ISPs have not worked. There are
two major reasons why these private suits have failed. First, ISP enforcement is, by and large, limited to those ISPs who are large enough to
afford to pursue such claims (which, as America Online's experience has
shown, is an incessant task). Although the largest ISPs have such resources, they cannot file such suits unless their own servers or trademarks are violated. If the spam overloads their customers' email
accounts through different servers, 39 America Online's customers-who
are injured because their email accounts are filled with junk, and because the Internet as a whole is slower and less reliable-are out of luck.
Second, the spammers are, as always, a step ahead of the anti-spam ISPs
and are attempting to circumvent litigation by building their own Internet backbone: 40 the company will "pay other networks to carry its
junk email." 4 1 Even if such a plan never comes to fruition, spammers
Matthew Seidl, Verified Complaint (last modified May 5, 1998) <http:I!
www.cs.colorado.edu/-seidl/lawsuit/complaint.html> (trespass to chattels); Strong Complaint, supra note 23 (trespass to chattels); Typhoon Complaint, supra note 30 (trespass to
chattels); Web Systems Corp. v. Cyber Promotions (last modified June 10, 1997) <http:l/
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/websysl.html> (nuisance, nuisance per se, trespass, and
conversion).
29. See Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 26; Typhoon Complaint, supra note 23.
30. See Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 26; Concentric Complaint, supra note 26; Juno
Complaint, supra note 26; Typhoon Complaint, supra note 26.
31. See Concentric Complaint, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. See id.; People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., June 23, 1997);
Juno Complaint, supra note 26.
34. See Seidl, supra note 25 (negligence, negligence per se, and negligent hiring).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.; Strong Complaint, supra note 26.
39. An example would be if America Online's users were spammed, but not in such
great numbers that AOL's servers crashed or otherwise suffered damage. In the absence of
an intellectual property or some common law violation, neither AOL nor the spain recipient
could take legal action.
40. See Randy Barrett, Spammers to Set Up Own Backbone, INTER@CTIVE WEEK (Nov.
26, 1997) (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/971126a.html>.
41. See The Spam Bone Connects to the Funny Bone, WIRED (Dec. 31, 1997) (visited
Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/9427.html>. Some com-
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can continue to jump from ISP to ISP or, as "Spam King" Sanford Wallace formerly did, rent bandwith from a willing ISP.42
B.

STATE LAWS

Due in part to the futility of the dozens of private suits that had been
filed against spammers, some states have begun to pass laws attempting
to limit the practice. As of October, 2000, thirty-three states have considered anti-spain legislation. Seventeen - Nevada, Washington, California, Illinois, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, Iowa, and West Virginia,
Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee-had actually passed laws: none prohibit sparn
43
outright.
The Nevada law was a disappointment to anti-spam advocates. Although the original version of the bill would have prohibited outright the
practice of sending UCE, 4 4 the law as eventually passed requires only
that the email include the sender's address, as well as removal instructions.45 Consequently, the law will not prevent the most harmful aspect
of spam: the outrageous quantities of untargeted emails that have
caused so many system overloads. Furthermore, since the businesses
that spam change constantly, the law, which immunizes the spammer's
ISP, will do little to reduce the traffic snarls that prompted the push for
regulation in the first place. The law is not merely under inclusive, it is
too narrowly tailored to accomplish anything.
Similarly, the bill passed in Washington originally would have
banned spain altogether. 46 As passed, the law forbids commercial
emailers from putting false or misleading information in the subject line
of the message, using a third party's domain name without permission,
or otherwise forging headers. 4 7 Enforcement is by the Attorney General
or private action; 48 furthermore, the law specifically authorizes ISPs to
block incoming or outgoing spams. 4 9 Critics argue that spammers will
mentators believe that the spain backbone is vaporware, and will never become a reality.

Id.
42. See Kornblum, supra note 16.
43. In sixteen states-Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin-anti-spam bills (or provisions within more general
bills) either were defeated or are still under consideration.
44. See S. 13, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1997).
45. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.705 (1998).
46. See H. 2752, 55th Leg., 1998 Reg. Sess., 1998 Wash. Laws ch. 149.
47. See id.
48. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.080 (attorney general), 19.86.090 (private right of
action), 19.190.030 (con pro act violation).
49. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.050.
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easily evade the law by signing up for throwaway accounts 50 and that
spam will continue unabated. 5 1 However, this criticism fails to consider
that spammers remain accountable under the law-if not to their ISPswhether they use a throwaway account or not.
Washington's law was strengthened in 1999 to forbid spammers
from using false domain names or false or misleading subject lines5 2 and
to require spammers to include identifying information in the body of the
message.5 3 Furthermore, the legislature authorized the Attorney General to create an electronic registry of email addresses that spammers
may search to determine whether his or her targets are protected by the
new law. 54 The new law also prohibits violations of ISPs' terms of service and provides a private right of action for violations to both ISPs and
s5
their customers 5
Like Washington, California has passed two laws to restrict spam.
The first, Assembly Bill 1676, is not stringent: it merely requires spammers to include opt-out instructions in the body of the spam, and the
warnings "ADV" or "ADV:ADLT" in the subject line.5 6 The law only applies when both the recipient and the ISP conveying the spam are located in California. 57 The second law is more comprehensive. Although
it does not ban spamming, as the original version of the bill would have,
it creates a private right of action for ISPs whose terms of service are
violated by spammers. In addition, it criminalizes using a false domain
name to send messages, if use of the name causes damage to a computer
system.5 8 The law provides no relief for individual recipients of spam,
who must continue to proceed under common law theories against spammers who have injured them.
50. Throwaway accounts are email accounts that the spammer intends to use one time
only (for a spam), thus avoiding personal accountability with his or her usual ISP. SEE
Peter Lewis, '98 Review - Preview '99, Seattle Times, Dec. 27, 1998, at C1, available in
1998 WL 24470928
51. See Brian McWilliams, Washington State Legislature Votes on Watered-Down
Spam Law PC WORLD (Feb. 19, 1998) (visited Aug. 15, 1999) <http://www2.pcworld.com/
news/daily/ data/0298/98021917914.html>.
52. See H. 1037, 56th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999), at §§ 2,3.
53. See id.
54. See id. at § 4. The registry is at Washington Association of Internet Service Providers, WAISP Registry Page (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.registry.waisp.org>.
55. See id.
56. See A. 1676, 1998 Sess. (Cal. 1998), at § 1. See also Pa. SB 262 (A.1) (Banning
UCEs containing "explicit sexual materials" without including "ADV-ADULT" in subject
line); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2501 (requiring "ADV" in subject line, as well as
return address information, a ban on the distribution of spamming software, and the institution of a private right of action).
57. See id. at § 1(d).
58. See CAL.PENAL CODE § 502(c)(9) (2000).
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The Illinois law, titled the "Electronic Mail Act," prohibits spammers
from falsifying their messages' point of origin or using false or misleading information in the subject line.5 9 It only applies to spams involving
recipients or computer equipment located in Illinois. 60 Unlike in Califor61
nia, in Illinois Internet users have a private right of action, as do ISPs.
In addition, ISPs may block spam.6 2 The Act also adds falsifying routing
information in connection with transmitting spain to the state's criminal
offense of computer tampering. 63 Iowa's law is similar, except that it
relies on private lawsuits and the attorney general's civil enforcement
64
powers, rather than criminal sanction.
The Maryland law is far more lenient than the other states: it does
not prohibit or regulate spamming outright. It instead criminalizes the
misuse of email with intent to harass, or the sending of "lewd, lascivious,
or obscene material."6 5 The law does not apply to political speech. 6 6 Because of its exclusive focus on content, the Maryland law appears much
more vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge than do the other laws
which states have passed, particularly given the Supreme Court's decision in ACLU v. Reno, 67 which invalidated regulation of "indecent"
speech on the Internet. Maryland's proscription of "lewd [or] lascivious"
content is as vague as the invalidated sections of the federal Communications Decency Act were. 68 Despite the less searching scrutiny the
Court gives to restrictions on commercial speech, it seems unlikely that
Maryland could show a substantial interest sufficient to uphold the regulation.6 9 From the point of view of ISPs and spam recipients, even if the
law were constitutional, it would be unhelpful in the extreme, because it
does nothing to prevent or punish the system overloads, clogged mailboxes, and other problems that UCE creates.
Virginia recently amended its computer trespass law to include falsifying or forging routing information, as well as distributing software
59. See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 511/10 (2000).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. See also No. Rev. Stat. § 207.1300 et seq. (2000) (Similarly requiring valid
return address information, immunizing ISPs, and providing for $1,000 damage award in
private civil actions).
63. See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 511/10 at § 16D-3.
64. H.F. 448, 2000 Leg. Assembly (Iowa 2000). See also Idaho Code § 48-603E (2000)
("Unfair Bulk Electronic Mail Advertisement Practices").
65. See 27 Md. Code Ann. §§ 555C(1)(B), (C).
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Compare id. with 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1996).
See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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70
with the primary purpose of falsifying or forging routing information.
It permits ISPs to block spam 7 1 and provides a private right of action for
7 2
both ISPs and their customers.

Delaware's law, which does not provide Internet users with a private
right of action, is still relatively tough on spammers. It provides that a
person is guilty of "the computer crime of unrequested or unauthorized
electronic mail," a misdemeanor, when he or she intentionally or recklessly spams, falsifies headers, or distributes software with the primary
73
purpose of falsifying or forging routing information.
Finally, West Virginia prohibits fraudulent or deceptive bulk email,
or unauthorized email that falsifies headers, contains sexually explicit
materials, or contains false or misleading information in the subject
line. 74 It immunizes ISPs from liability for terminating service to spammers and prohibits the sale or possession of spamming software that falsifies headers. 75 It provides a private right of action to spam recipients,
with nominal damages of $1,000 per spam, and authorizes punitive dam76
ages for the "willful failure to cease initiating" spam.
While these laws are a step in the right direction, their loopholes
may doom them to failure. Even laws that provide private rights of action may not be enforceable in practice: few users are likely to pursue a
court remedy against a difficult-to-trace spammer, given that statutory
damages run from only $10-$1,000 and often do not provide for attorney
fee awards. 77 More importantly, because of the interstate nature of the
Internet, state-by-state regulation of spammers' marketing practices
raises dormant commerce clause issues, which could invalidate all of the
regulations. One trial court in Washington State has already come to
this conclusion, holding that the statute is "unduly restrictive and burdensome and places a burden on businesses that outweighs its benefits
to consumers" in a case that the state attorney general brought against
an Oregon spammer who sent between 100,000 and 1 million UCEs a
70. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4(A)(7), (B) (2000). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14458(a) (similarly, but without software ban) and § 1-539.2A (authorizing private right of
action); Okla. Stat. tit. 15 § 776.1 (similarly); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 and 11-52-5-6
)amending computer trespass law, includes criminal penalties and private right of action).
71. See § 18.2-152.4(D).
72. See § 18.2-152.12(B), (C).
73. House Substitute for H.B. 242, 140th Gen. Assembly, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Del. 1999),
§ 1. See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73.6 (similar, except defines spam only as commercial
bulk UCE distributed in violation of ISP policy; provides for $5,000 criminal fine).
74. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6G-2 (1999).
75. See §§ 46A-6G-3, 46A-6G-4.
76. § 46A-6G-5.
77. See e.g., Idaho Code § 48-603E94)(2000) ($1000 damages); 720 ILCS 5/16D-3(b)(4)
(Illinois $10); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-6 ($500).

20001

NEW APPROACHES TO CURB SPAM

week. 78 Although the ruling will likely be appealed, every one of the
state anti-spam laws (except possibly California's) is vulnerable to similar constitutional challenges. Furthermore, even if the appellate courts
uphold state anti-spam laws against commerce clause and federal and
state free speech challenges, the fact remains that regulating spain
state-by-state is inefficient. This is true both from the point of view of
consumers, whose rights and remedies now vary widely, and of online
businesses, who have an interest in consistent regulation. Consequently, a federal solution is preferable than the current patchwork of
contested state regulations.
Thus far, the legal odyssey of spain has followed in the footsteps of
the junk fax. Junk faxing was once a costly obstruction to businesses'
use of their fax machines. States began to pass laws against the practice. 7 9 This did not work, because states did not have jurisdiction over
interstate calls.8 0 It took passage of a federal law, the Telephone Consumer Privacy Act (TCPA), to cut off the junk fax problem. 8 ' While a
federal solution conceivably would still allow junk emailers to move their
operations abroad, such a result is unlikely; most spammers operate
from small or micro-businesses that do not have the resources to relocate. Furthermore, international mail order is complex and costly, a line
of business likely to be unattractive to marketers who turned to spam82
ming in the first place because it is easy and cheap..

78. Peter Lewis, Anti-Spare E-Mail Suit Tossed Out, SEATTLE

TIMES,

Mar. 14, 2000, at

Al.
79. See Michael M. Parker, Fax Pas: Stopping the Junk Fax Mail Bandwagon, 71 OR.
L. REV. 457, 462 (1992).
80. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945). In fact, state
regulation of interstate calls might have withstood a dormant Commerce Clause challenge:
the state would only have been required to show that the regulation was rationally related
to a legitimate state end, and that the burden on interstate commerce was outweighed by
the state interest. Id. See also S. REP. No. 102-178, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1966, 1968. However, the legislative history to the Telephone Consumer Privacy Act does not seriously engage the issue; it simply asserts that states do not have jurisdiction over interstate calls. Id.
81. But see Andrew Gerlin, Junk Fax Senders Get Sued as Businesses FightBack, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 14, 1995, at F2. See also Murphey v. Lanier, No. 97-CV1784-BTM (POR), available in 1998 WL 154410 (S.D. Cal., May 30, 1998); Kenro, Inc. v.
Fax Daily, 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997). All involve incidents ofjunk faxing after the
passage of the TCPA. Id.
82. But see Robert Raisch, Postage Due Marketing, Revisited, Part II (last modified
Dec. 11, 1997) <http://www.internautics.com/article960917.htm> (suggesting Internet access provider-enforced "community standard" to stem tide of overseas spare).
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: SPAM IS NOT
PROTECTED SPEECH

Before analyzing the various legislative proposals before Congress,
it is necessary to analyze the constitutional status of spain. Spammers
claim that the First Amendment protects their activities-and even that
private ISPs are required to carry their missives.8 3 As we shall see,
spammers' current practices are not protected by the First
84
Amendment.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND: COMMERCIAL SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
JUNK FAX LAW

Commercial speech does enjoy First Amendment protection,8 5 although it is unclear how that "local ordinance" maps onto cyberspace8 6 in
the presence of competing norms. Of course, advertising that is false or
misleading is not protected by the Constitution.8 7 Commercial speech is
also subject to greater constraints than "core" political speech; in particular, the government has greater latitude to impose time, place, or manner restrictions on advertising than on advocacy.8 8 The landmark case
of Virginia Board of Pharmacy, decided in 1976, stands for the principle
that consumers enjoy a First Amendment right to receive commercial
speech.8 9 The restrictive rules of third party standing might make it difficult, however, for spammers to assert such a claim. 90
VirginiaBoard of Pharmacy'sbroad protection of commercial speech
was limited less than five years later in the case of Central Hudson Gas
83. See Cyber Promotions v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
84. See, e.g., Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993) (Article I, § 8 of state
constitution violated by state junk fax law). Spammers may be protected by state constitutions, some of which provide more stringent protections. Id.
85. See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
86. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability, Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1647 (1995).
87. Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 771 ("[U]ntruthful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.").
88. See id. at 771 ("[W~e have often approved restrictions of that kind.").
89. See id. at 747.
90. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (allowing third-party standing where
failure to let third party proceed would adversely affect her rights); Carey v. Population
Services Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (allowing third-party standing where third and primary
parties had a unity of interest and there was a substantial obstacle to primary party exercising own rights). Although Virginia Board of Pharmacy was brought as a third party
claim, in general it is quite difficult to assert third-party standing. Id. The Supreme Court
generally requires, at minimum, that the third-party plaintiff show unity of interest with a
directly affected party, as well as some substantial obstacle to that party exercising his or
her own rights. In the case of sparn, it would be difficult for a spammer to argue it has the
requisite unity of interest with consumers, as so many have taken action to prevent spain
from invading their email accounts.
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v. Public Service Commission,9 1 which promulgated a four-part test to
determine whether state regulation of commercial speech violates the
First Amendment. The test inquires:
1) Is the speech protected?9 2 In other words, is it misleading 93 or
proposing an illegal transaction? 94 If so, the speech can be banned completely. Although the nature of a great deal of UCE clearly fails this test,
a speech category consisting only of spam would likely also contain
truthful claims. Not all spam is of the "make money fast" variety. The
fact that many spams advertise unwanted products or services does not
make them illegal or misleading. Because that is the case, spain does
enjoy some First Amendment protection and thus may be regulated only
in accord with the other three parts of the Central Hudson test.
2) Does the government have a "substantial" interest to support the
regulation?95 In the case of spain, there are at least four such interests:
reducing the system overloads that are a demonstrably crushing burden
on network capacity, preventing spammers from misappropriating
others' servers and identities, preventing consumer fraud, and reducing
the heavy cost burden that spain shifts from the advertiser to the listener. Cost shifting alone, of course, does not justify regulation when the
burden is minimal and publicly borne, 9 6 such as the cost of paying government to remove litter caused by advertising handbills. However, in
the case of spam, the cost burden is so crushing at both the individual
and system levels 9 7 that courts should find that it is one properly
shouldered by the advertiser. 98 The clutter spam creates is analogous to
a situation in which handbill litter blocks use of the sidewalk and intersection for hours or days at a time: this is not de minimis and certainly
should be regulable.
3) Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest?99 As we shall see, some proposed legislative solutions directly advance the interests asserted; others do not.
4) Is the regulation no more restrictive than necessary to achieve
the desired end? l0 0 With respect to several of the bills being considered
by Congress, the regulations would not be extensive enough to solve the
91. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
92. See id. at 563-64.
93. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
94. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commn., 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
95. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
96. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
97. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
98. Cf Destination Ventures v. Federal Communications Commission, 46 F.3d 54, 57
(9th Cir. 1995).
99. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
100. See id.
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problems spam causes. Furthermore, the Court has interpreted the "no
more restrictive than necessary" prong of the text to indicate a scrutiny
somewhat less searching than that under the "narrow tailoring" analysis
used for some regulations involving noncommercial speech. 10 1
Completely banning spam may be within the government's authority. Consistent access to the Internet is crucial to the viability of an increasing sector of the U.S. economy. The aggregate costs of spam are
threatening the continued viability of the net as a reliable communications medium. Despite the fact that the Court's most recent commercial
speech decision in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island10 2 subjected regulations of commercial speech to greater scrutiny, that decision expressly
addressed regulations covering advertisements that were not false, misleading, illegal, or aggressive:' 0 3 spam often displays all of these attributes at once. Furthermore, that case involved a total ban on truthful
information contained in advertisements of liquor prices. 10 4 The interest
served by such a regulation, temperance, 10 5 received much less deference by the Court than should an anti-spam regulation, which protects
both privacy and property. Even if a ban covered commercial speech that
was not false, misleading, or illegal, prohibiting the practice of sending
hundreds of thousands of unsolicited commercial messages, at a huge
expense to the recipients and countless third parties with a highly detrimental effect that threatens the survival of a medium that has become
increasingly necessary to the smooth functioning of commerce, would
serve an important governmental interest. The only real constitutional
question with respect to anti-spam regulations is whether these regulations are written narrowly enough to satisfy the Central Hudson test.

B.

LEGAL ANTECEDENTS: THE 'JUNK FAX' PROBLEM

The Internet is not, of course, the first new medium that shady and
intrusive "entrepreneurs" have attempted to hijack in pursuit of a quick
buck. The best analogy to spain is not telesolicitation, broadcast ads, or
direct paper mail: it is the junk fax. Like an email account, a fax machine does not require human interaction or attention to oversee the receipt of a message. Like unwanted email, unwanted faxes can be quickly
trashed. Like email technology, fax machines can be easily configured to
send the same message to a great number of recipients simultaneously
with very little effort by the sender. 10 6 And fax machine owners, like
101. Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
102. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
103. See id. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 489.
105. See id. at 493.
106. There are also dissimilarities. For example, unlike fax recipients, email users receive the span at little cost to themselves. The aggregate costs, however, appear to be
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email users, had a huge problem with unsolicited commercial messages
that threatened the viability of the fax as a communications medium,
until the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) banned the prac10 7
tice of junk faxing.
The TCPA provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person within
the United States to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or
other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." 10 8 The law permits the Federal Communications Commission to exempt noncommercial speakers from a provision of the law
banning recorded telemarketing calls,10 9 but not from the junk fax provision. Aggrieved recipients have a private right of action for an injunction
and damages of up to $500 from the junk faxer. 110 The law permits the
creation of a national database of individuals who do not want to receive
calls from telemarketers. 11 1 Finally, the law requires all faxes to bear a
1 12
mark of origin.
It did not take long for telemarketers and junk faxers to challenge
the new law as violative of the First Amendment. In two cases, the
Ninth Circuit held against the plaintiff telemarketers and junk faxes.
The first case, Moser v. Federal Communications Commission, 113 involved the TCPA's ban on automated calls. The U.S. District Court for
the District of Oregon had held for the telemarketers; the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Noting that the federal law was required because existing
state laws were incapable of regulating interstate calls (an issue that is
germane to the analysis of state laws regulating spam),1 14 the court
found that the TCPA did not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial calls. 1 15 Thus, it concluded, the law should be analyzed as a
much higher with spam than with junk faxes. Compare supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (aggregate costs of spam) with Jim Barber, Junk Faxes on Rise with Toothless Law,
Houston Chron., Mar. 14, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 3978824 (citing only expense of
paper and tied-up phone lines as junk fax costs).
107. Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, Junk E-Mail and On-Line Services: Unspreadable Spam, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1997, at 3.
108. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (1994).
109. See § 227(b)(2)(B)(I).
110. See § 227(b)(3).
111. See § 227(c)(3).
112. See § 227(d)(2).
113. See Moser v. Federal Communications Commission, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. See id. at 972. The court noted that the state laws had also faced constitutional
challenges; Oregon's law was struck down on state constitutional grounds in Moser v.
Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993). Id.
115. See Moser, 46 F. 3d at 973. Language permitting the FCC to exempt non-commercial callers from its regulations, the court held, was "permissive ... [ilt in no way requires
the FCC to adopt such exemptions." Id. at 972. This rather convoluted reasoning is unpersuasive; the legislative findings the court cites just a few paragraphs earlier make it manifestly clear that the TCPA is not content-neutral. Id.
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"content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction" rather than under
Central Hudson, but the tests are "essentially identical."1 16 Under that
analysis, the restriction must be independently justifiable, narrowly tai117
lored, and leave open "ample alternative channels" of communication.
1 18
The TCPA's alleged under inclusiveness
did not rise to the level of a
First Amendment violation because it was not viewpoint-based and because the government was not required to completely eradicate the problem. 119 With respect to the "ample alternative channels" requirement,
the court held that such means did exist12 0 -just as a ban on spam
would leave open voluntary mailings, advertisements in appropriate
newsgroups, and many forms of Web-based advertising. As the court
noted, "That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached... is
not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged
with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of
12 1
publicity are open."
The reasoning in Moser provides strong support for the proposition
that regulation of spain is constitutional. Congressional findings on the
problems created by telephone solicitation are reasonably similar to
those created by spam. Furthermore, regulation seeking to curb some of
the most intrusive and obnoxious aspects of UCE-forged headers
preventing the target from replying, the dissemination of thousands of
messages at a time to every recipient at a particular domain, and
preventing other traffic from using the server for hours at a timeshould satisfy the courts as narrowly tailored enough to address the substantial government interests in protecting privacy and keeping the Internet up and running. However, the "prerecorded call" analogy does not
track perfectly onto spam, as UCE does not invade personal privacy as
directly as telesolicitation. On the other hand, UCE imposes direct financial costs onto consumers that telesolicitations do not, primarily the
22
cost of access time, at least for users whose ISPs charge by the hour.1
A closer, though imperfect, analogy is found in the junk fax portion
of the TCPA, which the Ninth Circuit upheld in Destination Ventures v.
Federal CommunicationsCommission.12 3 As noted above, the TCPA re116. See id. at 973.
117. See id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) and Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
118. See id. Plaintiff argued underinclusivity because, it said, pre-recorded telephone
calls constituted only 3 percent of telesolicitations. Id.
119. See id. at 974 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1994)).
120. See id. at 975.
121. Id. (quotingKovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949)).
122. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text. UCE also imposes substantial indirect financial and other costs on consumers. Id.
123. See Destination Ventures v. Federal Communications Commission, 46 F.3d 54 (9th
Cir. 1993).
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quires faxes to bear a "return address," the phone number from which
they are sent. It also prohibits the practice of sending unsolicited ads to
a fax machine.1 24 Unlike in Moser, in Destination Ventures the court focused on the government's interest in "prevent[ing] the shifting of advertising costs." 12 5 Also unlike Moser, the court analyzed the challenged
provision under the commercial speech regime of CentralHudson, which
requires that the regulation "directly advance a substantial government
interest in a manner that forms a 'reasonable fit' with the interest."' 2 6
In Destination Ventures, the plaintiff challenged the provision on the
grounds that it was not a "reasonable fit," since other forms of unsolicited faxes are also costly to consumers.127 Reasoning that advertising
caused the bulk of cost shifting, and that mere under inclusiveness
would not defeat the law, 1 2 8 the court held in the government's favor.
The best argument against directly applying a junk fax analysis to
the spam problem invokes time and scale as significant differences between spams and junk faxes: it takes a consumer no time at all to receive
a spam (whereas, the Destination Ventures court noted, it takes 30-45
seconds to receive a fax), the recipient's email account is not prevented
from receiving other email during the spam transmission, and the cost of
receiving a spam is minimal compared to the two and one-half cents per
page the Destination Ventures court found a recipient paid to receive
each fax. Although such distinctions are valid, they are shortsighted,
because they do not take into account the indirect costs borne by the
ISPs in equipment burdens, server failure, and staff time. Nor does it
consider the burden UCE imposes on users in the form of costs passed on
by ISPs, wasted time, and, for commercial users, business lost due to
system crashes or slowed response times. Because the interests involved
in staunching the incessant flow of spain so closely track those that justified the regulation of telephone solicitation and junk faxes, regulation of
spam on the TCPA model should be upheld by the courts.
Although amending the TCPA is probably the simplest solution to
the spam problem given the law's already proven efficacy and constitutionality, the only bill that proposed to do so died in the 104th Con124. See supra notes 77 and 81 and accompanying text.
125. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
126. Id. at 55 (citing Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commn.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). This formulation of the Central Hudson test is a slight variant
on the original, which requires not that the regulation "form a 'reasonable fit'" with the
asserted governmental interest, but that it be "no more restrictive than necessary" to advance the interest. The difference is probably not material, since the Court has interpreted
"no more restrictive than necessary" to require more deference to government than, for
example, a narrow tailoring requirement. Id. See also supra note 70 and accompanying

text.
127. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
128. See id.
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gress. 12 9 The bill, introduced by Rep. Chris Smith of New Jersey and
titled "The Netizens Protection Act of 1997," 1 30 would have amended the
TCPA to ban UCE unless there is a preexisting relationship between the
sender and recipient or the recipient grants his or her express consent. 13 1 It also would have required UCE to include the identity and
email address of the sender. 132 Because of its simplicity, certainty, and
willingness to place most of the onus on the advertiser, the Smith bill
could have succeeded in finally stemming the tide of UCE. It remains to
be seen whether the bill will be reintroduced in a subsequent Congress or
whether this eminently sensible solution will be forgotten, and one of the
current, less comprehensive bills analyzed below will be adopted instead.
C.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Currently, there are five bills pending before Congress that purport
to address the spam problem. 13 3 Organized anti-spammers are most enthusiastic about HR 2162, the "Can Spam Act," 13 4 introduced by Rep.
Gary Miller of California. The bill, which would provide ISPs with a private right of action against spammers as well as create criminal penalties for some forms of spamming, was drafted with the input of the
Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email ("CAUCE"), a group of
ISPs and other Internet professionals. 1 35 Other bills pending would extend the criminal fraud statute to the Internet, 13 6 authorize the Federal
Trade Commission to apply its antifraud rules to Internet commercial
activity, 137 allow ISPs to prevent their domains from receiving spam
under certain conditions,' 38 and provide for civil and criminal penalties
(as well as a private right of action against spammers) who falsify their
identity or routing information, ignore opt-out requests, or distribute
software that forges identifying information. 139
129. See WL 1998 CQ US HR 1748 summary (tracking bill trough legislative process to
its ultimate failure.
130. H.R. 1748, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
131. See id. at § 2(3).
132. See id. at § 3(3).
133. See WL 1998 CQ US S 771 (tracking bill through legislative process to its ultimate
failure); 1998 CQ US S 875 (tracking bill through legislative process to its ultimate failure);
1998 CQ US HR 4124 (tracking bill through legislative process to its ultimate failure); 1998
CQ US HR 1748 (tracking bill through legislative process to its ultimate failure). None of
the four bills introduced during the 105th Congress passed.
134. See H.R. 2162, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
135. See Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email, PendingLegislation (visited
Mar. 28, 2000) <http'//www.cauce.org/legislation.html>.
136. See S. 699, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); H.R. 612, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
137. See id.
138. See S. 759, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
139. See H.R. 1910, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
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S. 699/H.R. 612: The "TelemarketingFraud and Seniors Protection
Act" / "ProtectionAgainst Scams on Seniors Act of 1999"

This bill, 140 introduced in the Senate by Sen. Wyden and in the
House by Rep. Weygand, would help crack down on some of the most
pernicious spamming practices but would not regulate spamming directly. Section 201141 of both bills would extend the criminal fraud statute 14 2 to the Internet. Section 202 would authorize the Federal Trade
Commission to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to set forth the application of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45), and
other statutory provisions within its jurisdiction, to deceptive acts or
practices . . .in connection with the promotion, advertisement, offering
for sale, or sale of goods or services through use of the Internet, including
the initiation, transmission, and receipt of unsolicited commercial elec14 3
tronic mail.
Although it is unclear how extensive such FTC regulation would be,
S.699 and H.R. 612 as currently written clearly pass the CentralHudson
test. First, the bills target only is misleading speech; truthful claims
would not be caught in their net. Second, reducing consumer fraud is
clearly a substantial governmental interest. Third, the regulation involved-extending regulatory authority to the FTC, which already regulates consumer fraud perpetrated through other media-more directly
advances the governmental interest the bills seek to vindicate than
would other solutions, such as authorizing a private right of action. Finally, the regulation involved is, in the abstract, no more restrictive than
necessary to achieve the desired end of lessening consumer fraud. This
may not be true of the regulations that the FTC would eventually
promulgate.
In the end, although the bills themselves are undoubtedly constitutional under Central Hudson, the regulations they spawn may not be. It
is thus impossible to predict with certainty whether this particular antifraud proposal will ultimately pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, although the bills themselves are not under inclusive with respect
to their professed goals, neither will they do anything to stem the tide of
spam washing into users' mailboxes. Nor will they solve system wide
problems (including the havoc slowed systems wreak on legitimate electronic commerce) caused by spamming. It seems highly unlikely that
S.R. 699 and H.R. 612 will have any impact at all on spam's most destructive tendency: overloading server after server, bringing down the
Internet one node at a time.
140.
141.
142.
143.

S. 699, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); H.R. 612, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
See S. 699 § 201; H.R. 612 § 201.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
S. 699 § 202; H.R. § 202.
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2. S. 759: The "Inbox Privacy Act of 1999"
This bill, introduced by Sen. Murkowski of Alaska, is more inclusive
than the Wyden and Weygand bills in that it responds, albeit in a flawed
manner, to the problems spain creates for individual users. However, it
also creates an unwieldy system that requires ISPs to permit spam and
does not prevent spammers from reselling email addresses of who do not
wish to receive UCE.
The general thrust of the Murkowski bill is to forbid the transmission of UCE if the recipient "submits to the [spammer] a request that the
initiation of the transmission of such mail by the person to such other
person not occur." 144 A user may accomplish this in any "appropriate"
way, including sending a "remove" message to the email address, which
all spammers must include in the body of their messages. However, in
order to do so, one must receive a spam first-and the damage is done.
Furthermore, making an online purchase constitutes authorization to receive spare from that business. 14 5 The bill also requires UCE to include
information identifying the sender.
The Murkowski bill's provisions relating to ISPs have already
sparked criticism. 14 6 It permits a domain owner (who may or may not
also be an ISP) to opt out of receiving spam by notifying its users and the
FTC, 147 which will be required to keep a list of all spam-free domains. 1 48
However, the bill requires ISPs to permit their customers to elect to continue receiving sparn and to make a list of the customers opting in available to the public; yet an ISP may not pass the cost of UCE on to such
customers. 149 The bill also authorizes FTC regulation of deceptive Internet trade practices, 150 Attorney General suits for violations of the requirements pertaining to users' opt-out rights and the requirement to
provide identifying information, and ISP suits for violations of the provision allowing domain-wide opt-outs.' 5 ' Finally, it preempts all state or

1 52
local laws dealing with spam.
The Murkowski bill is much more comprehensive than are the
Wyden and Wygand bills in that it addresses the system-wide problems
that spam can create, particularly through the use of forged headers.
Spammers forge headers to avoid hearing from people who are angry
that they have been sent UCE, or who request removal from the mailing
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See S. 759, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999), § 2(a)(1).
id. § 2(a)(3)(B).
See Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email, supra note 135.
See S. 759, § 2(c).
See id. § 4(c).
See id. § 2(c)(3).
See id. § 3.
See id. §§ 5, 6.
See id. § 7.
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list. The practice is responsible for a large portion of the costs ISPs pay
in dealing with bounce-backs, 153 irate users, and lawyers prosecuting
the intellectual property violations of trademark infringement and misappropriation inherent to the practice.' 5 4 The Murkowski bill probably
represents the least restrictive alternative that does anything at all to
advance the government's interest in keeping the Internet open for
business. 155
The Murkowski bill appears constitutionally fit under CentralHudson. Unlike the Wyden and Weygand bills, it casts a net that catches
more communications than just those that are false or misleading.
Therefore, there must be a substantial government interest to support
the bill. Here, that interest is preventing fraud and protecting the integrity of individual email accounts, much as the TCPA protected users' fax
machines from an unremitting flow of postage-due advertisements. The
bill meets the requirement of the third Central Hudson prong-that the
regulation directly advance the government interest-by clearly targeting the destructive practice of header forgery as well as spammers' propensity to hide from unwilling recipients who wish to be removed from
the mailing list. 1 5 6 Finally, the Murkowski bill clearly passes the fourth
Central Hudson prong: requiring opting-out ISPs to allow their customers to opt back in is much less restrictive than it need have been to effec15 7
tively combat the system-wide slowdowns that UCE creates.
Despite its constitutionality, the Murkowski bill has received little
support from users. The major reason for this is that it still permits costshifting onto ISPs and users by placing the burden on ISPs to maintain
two email systems: one that permits spam and one that does not. Furthermore, as CAUCE points out, requiring companies to list its mail host
names on the FTC's public Web site could create a security risk, and the
bill's requirements interfere with the terms of the contract between an
158
ISP and its users.

153. See Kimberly Patch & Eric Smalley, E-mail Overload, Network World, Oct. 26,
1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 17476163. A "bounce-back" is a spain sent to an email
address that is not in service; the message bounces back to the return address. Staff of the
ISP whose address was listed on the sparn's header are thus hit with a large amount of
email which is , in effect, marked "return to sender."
154. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
155. See SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). Of course, commercial speech restrictions
are not required to be the least restrictive alternative. Id.
156. See id. at § 2(d)and (e).
157. See id. at §1(c).
158. See Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email, supra note 135.
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H.R. 2162: The "Can Spain Act"

Like the Murkowski bill, this bill, introduced by Rep. Gary Miller (RCa.), preempts state and local anti-spam laws; aside from this flaw, it is
the bill most likely to slow down the flow of UCE. The bill flatly prohibits using an ISP's equipment to transmit spain (where the ISP has
posted an anti-spam policy) 15 9 and provides a private right of action to
ISPs (though not to individual users), 160 with damages available up to
$25,000 per day for each violation, as well as injunctive and declaratory
relief and attorney fees. 16 1 It also criminalizes the common practice of
unauthorized use of a domain name, if such use damages a system or
network.162
The bill appears constitutionally fit. Although it targets speech that
is not necessarily misleading or proposing an illegal transaction, the government's substantial interest in regulation is the same as with all the
other anti-spam bills and, for that matter, the TCPA: preventing cost
shifting, preventing fraud, and protecting the telecommunications infrastructure. To this end, the Miller bill directly advances the government's interest by targeting the practice that has resulted in the greatest
amount of cost-shifting and system damage: unauthorized use of an
ISP's servers and forgery of domain names. The regulation is not unduly
restrictive, as it does not ban spam outright, but instead merely regulates the most destructive aspects of spam. Most importantly, the bill
shifts the costs of spam back where they belong: onto the advertiser.
From a user's point of view, however, the Miller bill is underinclusive in the extreme. It does not require that spam be directed only to
those users who opt to receive such messages-an important goal of
many anti-spammers. Furthermore, it does not require spammers to
honor opt-out requests or even require them to provide a valid e-mail
address where their targets can direct such a request.
4. H.R. 1910: The "E-Mail User Protection Act"
This bill, introduced by Rep. Gene Green of Texas, provides civil and
criminal penalties for several of the most pernicious spamming practices.
It imposes a civil fine for using false identifying information in an unsolicited bulk email message, using false router information, ignoring optout requests, or distributing software that forges router or identifying
information. 163 Spammers who misappropriate another person's name
or email address, or who send spam to a person who has previously opted
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See
See
See
See
See

H.R. 2162, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a) (1999).
id. § 2(c).
id. at § 2(c)(1)(B)
id. § 3.
H.R. 1910, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1999).
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out, face criminal prosecution. 16 4 The bill authorizes a private right of
action for any ISP injured by a spammer's falsification of router information, and one for any UCE recipient injured by any of the practices for
which the spammer may receive a civil or criminal sanction.165 The bill
only applies to commercial email, and, like the Murkowski bill, exempts
messages sent to a recipient who has a "prior relationship" with the
sender, as well as mail sent to a user who has "affirmatively requested to
16 6
receive communications" from the sender.
Like the other bills under consideration, the Green proposal likely
passes the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test. While it goes
farther than the Miller bill in regulating UCE (most notably by requiring
spammers to identify themselves and to honor opt-out requests), it is
somewhat vulnerable on the third and fourth prongs of the CentralHudson test with respect to the opt-out requirement. Direct marketers could
argue that the opt-out provision not only does not directly advance the
government's cost-shifting, fraud, and system damage concerns, it unduly restricts truthful commercial speech, regulation of which receives
more First Amendment protection under 44 Liquormart. However, such
an argument could easily be defeated by pointing out that the aggressive
speech that the opt-out requirement targets does not come under the aegis of 44 Liquormart. The resolution of this issue remains uncertain6 7
because the TCPA cases did not involve opt-out lists.'
Like the other bills discussed here, the Green bill is not perfect from
the point of view of many users, primarily because it employs an opt-out
rather than an opt-in system. Furthermore, some critics argue that any
legislation that permits spamming to continue, as does the Green bill
(and, it is important to note, all the others), is flawed because it "legitimizes" the practice. However, given that Congress does not seem inclined to ban UCE outright, the Green bill probably represents the next
best alternative.
5.

H.R. 3113: The Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of
2000.

This bill, introduced by Reps. Heather Wilson (R-N.M.) and Gene
Green
(D-Tx.), passed the House of Representatives July 18, 2000.168 It
contains Congressional findings of fact with respect to the critical role of
164. See id. § 2(b).
165. See id. § 4(a).
166. Id. § 5.
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (1994). The telesolicitation portion of the TCPA contemplates the creation of a nationwide opt-out list. Id.
168. See 1999 CONG US HR 3113.
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the Internet in global communication and commerce, that "unsolicited
commercial email can be an important mechanism through which business advertises and attracts customers," the "significant" costs of spam,
and many spammers' shady business practices. 16 9 The bill restricts its
reach to commercial spam only. 170 1t provides criminal penalties for falsifying routing information,171 requires UCE to include a valid return
1 73
email address, 1 72 and requires spammers to respect opt-out requests.
The bill also purports
to provide government enforcement power of ISP policies regarding
1 74
UCE, provided that such policies are clear and publicly available.
17
5
State laws are explicitly not pre-empted,
and ISPs are immunized. 17 6 The FTC, individual victims, and the Attorney General all
have enforcement powers.1 77 The bill requires the FTC to study the
8
effects of UCE and the effectiveness of the bill, should it become law.17
This bill is similar to the Green proposal in its reach, and may cause
the same Central Hudson and 44 Liquormart problems due to the optout requirement. The dissimilarities between this bill and the Green bill
are not germane to its constitutionality or effectiveness, with one major
exception. HR 3133's authorization of a private right of action for individuals-a plaintiff class much more numerous than the ISPs covered by
the Green bill-would create a new pressure on the federal courts' dockets that may not be justified in the smaller-stakes context of individually
aggrieved spam victims, at least those who are not alleging significant,
actual monetary damages. Furthermore, if state laws do survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny at the appellate level, state courts may
be a more appropriate forum for such cases.

D. A BETTER

SOLUTION

Because of the underinclusivity of all the current bills, an extension
of the court-tested TCPA along the lines of the failed Smith bill remains
the only viable proposed solution to the ever-increasing spam problem.
If Congress does not revive the Smith bill, any new legislative solution
169. See HR 3113, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 2(a)(2000). See also HR 3113's companion
bill, S2542, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., at § 2(9) (the "Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2000") (making additional findings on the evils of"pandering" email).
170. See HR 3113 at §. 3(2).
171. See id. at § 4
172. See id. at § 5(a)(1)
173. See id. at § 5(a)(2))
174. See id. at § 5(b)
175. See id. at § 5(b)(3))
176. See id. at § 5(c)
177. See id. at § 6.
178. See id. at § 8.
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must address three critical issues: forgery of router and other identifying
information, misappropriation of servers, and cost shifting. To that end,
the Miller and the Green bills offer the most promise.
A better solution would be to introduce an entirely new bill combining the best of the past and current proposals. Such a bill would aim to
ameliorate a wide variety of the problems that spam creates for consumers, businesses, ISPs, and the government. This contrasts with the
piecemeal approach many existing state laws, and all current federal
bills, have taken.
The bill would start by amending the TCPA, as the Smith bill would
have, to require the recipient's consent before a marketer may send UCE
and to require truthful identifying information about the sender in every
piece of UCE. It would provide penalties for ignoring removal requests
and for reselling or reusing the address information of a user who requests removal. It would not provide implied consent to UCE based on a
single prior contact, as would the Murkowski and Green bills. This optin approach would be substantially more effective than an opt-out regime, as it would stop spam before it overloads servers and causes system damage.
Second, the bill, like the Wyden, Weygand, Murkowski, and Green
bills, would authorize the FTC to regulate spam in order to prevent consumer fraud. In other words, it would empower the FTC to ban common
spamming practices such as placing false or misleading information in
subject lines. However, it would not require the FTC to promulgate an
unwieldy, bureaucratic, and expensive-to-maintain global opt-in list, as
would the Murkowski bill.
Third, the bill would provide stiff civil and criminal penalties for the
most destructive spamming practices: misappropriating servers and
forging router, header, and other identifying information. This section
would provide for enforcement by the Attorney General and the FTC, as
does the Wilson/Green Bill.
The bill would authorize ISPs to block spam and provide a private
right of action for ISPs whose equipment is damaged by spammers. This
would include a provision for costs and attorney fees and a meaningful
statutory damage award in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief.
Such a provision would not replace any common law or intellectual property actions that ISPs could pursue against spammers; it would add to
the legal arrows in their quiver and provide more certainty to all parties
with respect to possible damage awards. Finally, it would provide a private right of action for users (mainly businesses, who are hardest hit by
spamming's detrimental effect on server connect times) who suffer actual
pecuniary damage from spam.
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There are a few provisions found in state laws (which the model bill,
like the Wilson/Green bill, would not preempt) that would not be included. The first is a private right of action in the federal courts for individual users who have not suffered individualized economic damage.
Quite simply, although the aggregate costs of spam are huge, to individual users this statutory cause of action would rarely, if ever, involve pecuniary damage in an amount sufficient to justify requiring the already
overburdened federal courts to intervene. Otherwise, enforcement
through the Attorney General, ISPs, the FTC, and business users who
suffer pecuniary damage directly attributable to spam should provide
that the law is prosecuted with sufficient vigor.
In addition, the bill would not outlaw the possession, sale, or distribution of software programs that enable mass emails. Clearly, a marketer's use of such a program would be relevant evidence in a trial in
which it is charged with violating the anti-spam statute. However, a flat
ban on such software sweeps too broadly, snaring noncommercial speakers in its net. Although that the damage and expense caused by bulk
email may justify regulation of such software even in a noncommercial
context, analysis of such a ban is beyond the scope of this article.
V.

CONCLUSION

Until comprehensive anti-spam legislation becomes law, spam recipients and ISPs will continue to play a futile game of legal whack-a-mole
with direct e-marketers. Intellectual property and common law actions
against spammers have proven a costly, ineffective, and piecemeal nonsolution. Similarly, the few state laws that have gone into effect protect
few users and may, as Congress concluded with respect to state anti-junk
fax laws, have constitutional problems under the dormant commerce
clause. While federal regulation will not stop all spam, it seems unlikely
that U.S. marketers will continue to spam if they are forced to dial into
an overseas connection to do so. Non-U.S. marketers selling Web-based
services may still spam, but if they do so by misappropriating U.S. equipment, any of the laws under consideration would confer jurisdiction over
the offender.
As discussed above in the context of already existing bills, the provisions of the model bill, as they must, fulfill the constitutional requirements of Central Hudson. The government's substantial interest in
ameliorating spam's most pernicious effects is directly advanced by requiring the marketer both to secure the recipient's consent and to include truthful identifying information in the email; these important
steps will reduce system overloads by allowing recipients to remove
themselves from unwanted mailing lists, while allowing businesses to
continue direct e-marketing. The provisions relating to the FTC deal
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with misleading advertisements, which under Central Hudson can be
banned outright; they are, therefore, not unconstitutional, even if they
did not directly advance a governmental interest, or were more restrictive than necessary to satisfy that interest. The civil and criminal penalties directly advance a substantial governmental interest by providing
an explicit penalty aimed at the effects of identity theft (i.e., the practice
of forging identifying information) and property damage (caused by misappropriation of servers). The ISP provisions directly advance a governmental interest in keeping the Internet open for business by empowering
ISPs to adopt individual technical solutions to prevent spammer damage
and by providing recourse if damage occurs. These provisions are a good
example of a truly less restrictive alternative to, for example, a government-run filtering system. Similarly, the private right of action for businesses encourages self-help, as opposed to overregulation.
The steps outlined above would go a long way toward stopping the
spam problem, in a manner that does not unconstitutionally target the
content of direct marketers' speech but rather the most intrusive and
destructive methods some employ. Congress should pass such a bill in
order to protect the telecommunications infrastructure, prevent further
consumer fraud, system damage, and intellectual property violations,
and preserve the viability of the Internet as a medium where both communications and commerce flourish.
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